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where the use of cognovit provisions is limited in some way and judgment is later sought in another state with unrestricted cognovit provisions. The state in which the judgment is sought could grant the judgment without notice and hearing either through the application of its
own nonrestrictive laws or through application of its own procedural
rules in conjunction with the substantive law regarding the use of cognovit provisions of the state of execution.
The district court's solution to this problem was to require disclosure in any case where it is possible for a creditor to obtain a judgment
against the debtor through the use of a cognovit clause without notice
and hearing. The court of appeals, by dwelling upon the language "in
those States""8 in the Board's Interpretation has replaced a solution that
is more in keeping with the spirit and purpose of the Truth in Lending
Act with one that seems technical and against the purpose of the Act.
The impact of this decision is somewhat limited. As previously indicated, only a few states allow unrestrictied use of cognovit provisions."
Moreover, the Swarb and Overmeyer decisions raise grave doubts as to
the constitutionality of the cognovit provisions employed by Beneficial
in this case and in most consumer credit transactions.
D. STEVE ROBBINS

Criminal Law-Increased Sentences on an Appeal by Right from Inferior
Courts
In 1969 the United States Supreme Court held in North Carolina
v. Pearce' that a criminal defendant who had successfully appealed his
original conviction could not receive a more severe sentence on reconviction unless the increase directly resulted from defendant's conduct subsequent to his original conviction. The Court concluded that while there
was no absolute constitutional bar to an increased sentence on retrial,2
due process precluded penalizing a defendant for having successfully
11469 F.2d at 456.
59
See note 54 supra.
1395 U.S. 711 (1969).

"'We hold, therefore, that neither the double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection
Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction." Id. at 723.
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attacked his original conviction. 3 Since a defendant who feared judicial
retaliation through vindictive sentencing could unconstitutionally be

deterred from exercising his right to appeal, due process required that
a defendant be freed of such an apprehension. 4 The Court therefore

imposed a rule that severely limited the imposition of increased sentences on retrial.'

However, in 1972 the United States Supreme Court held in Colten
v. Kentucky' that a criminal defendant who had exercised his absolute
right to a trial de novo in a superior court following conviction in an
inferior court could receive a more severe sentence upon reconviction
in a court of general criminal jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the
danger of being penalized for seeking a new trial was not inherent in
the Colten situation, 7 nor would a defendant be deterred from exercising

his absolute right to a new trial by a fear of judicial vindictiveness.' Thus
due process did not require the application of the Pearcerule to de novo
trials?
3

1d. at 724; see Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful"
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965). See also Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
4395 U.S. at 725.
'The Court formulated the Pearce rule as follows:
In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the
reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon
objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon
which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the
constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.
Id. at 726.
192 S. Ct. 1953 (1972).
7
1d. at 1960.
8
1d. For a discussion of the opposite view see Aplin, Sentence Increaseson RetrialAfter North
Carolina v. Pearce, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 427, 455-60 (1970). See also, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1, 187-92 (1969); Note, The Chilling Effect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 808, 837 (1969).
'he following cases have held that the Pearce Court's reasoning was applicable to trial de
novo: Wood v. Ross, 434 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded on ground of possible
mootness sub nom. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971); Griffin v. Wilkerson, 335 F.
Supp. 1272 (W.D. Va. 1972); Torrance v. Henry, 304 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1969); Bronstein v.
Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 251, 475 P.2d 235 (1970); State v. Shak, 51 Hawaii 626, 466 P.2d 420
267 N.E.2d 48 (1971); Cherry v. State, 9 Md. App. 416,
Ind. _
(1970); Eldridge v. State, 264 A.2d 887 (1970); Commonwealth v. Harper, 219 Pa. Super. 100, 280 A.2d 637 (1971).
Contra: Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017 (1970);
Mass. _., 271 N.E.2d 331 (1971); People v. Olary, 382 Mich.
Mann v. Commonwealth,_
559, 170 N.W.2d 842 (1969); Kansas City v. Henderson, 468 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1971); State v.
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Lewis Colten was tried and convicted of disorderly conduct in a
Kentucky inferior court." Inferior courts in Kentucky have jurisdiction
over those criminal offenses which are punishable by a maximum of one
year's imprisonment and a five hundred dollar fine." Trials in the inferior courts, the first tier of the Kentucky two-tier system, are generally
speedier and less costly than trials conducted in a court of general
jurisdiction, but they lack some of the constitutional safeguards available in the superior courts.' 2 The defendant in the inferior court may
either enter a defense to the charge or plead guilty. In either case, a
defendant convicted in an inferior court has an absolute right to a trial
de novo in a superior court. 13 In the trial de novo the case proceeds as
if brought in the superior court in the first instance." When Colten was
given an increased sentence following his conviction in the trial de novo,
he appealed his conviction on the basis that the Pearce rule was applicable to the trial de novo. 5 The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed his
Stanosheck, 186 Neb. 17, 180 N.W.2d 226 (1970); State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d
897 (1970); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 579, 186 S.E.2d 53, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925
(1972); Evans v. City of Richmond, 210 Va. 403, 171 S.E.2d 247 (1969).
"0The defendant was originally convicted in the Quarterly Court of Fayette County, Kentucky.
The Quarterly Court, a court of limited criminal jurisdiction, does not make a record of its
proceedings. Defendant was there fined ten dollars, and he exercised his right to appeal to a
superior court. Colten v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1971).
"KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.010, 26.010 (1970).
"2The extent to which inferior courts afford a defendant full protection of his constitutional
rights varies from state to state. Many inferior courts make no record of the proceedings, fail to
insure a jury trial, and generally conduct trials in a more relaxed manner than the trials conducted
in a court of general criminal jurisdiction.
"Ky. R. CRIM. P. 12.06. For an example of judicial application of a prior formulation of
this rule see Brown v. Hoblitzell, 307 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1957).
"Ky. R. CRIM. P. 12.06 provides that: "Appeals taken to the circuit court shall be docketed
by the clerk thereof as a regular criminal prosecution and shall be tried anew, as if no judgment
had been rendered, and the judgment shall be considered as affirmed to the extent of the punishment, if any, adjudged against the defendant in the circuit court ...." Many states have similar
statutory provisions: ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-371 (1956), § 22-375 (Supp. 1972-73); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 44-509 (1964); COLO R. CRIM. P. 37; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 924.41-.45 (Supp. 197273); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-713 (1956); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3609 to -3610 (Supp. 1972); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 156 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, § 43 (Supp. 1972); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.1226 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 488.20, 633.20-.22 (Supp. 1973); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 1201-02 (Supp. 1972); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 22; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 95-2004,
-2009 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-601, -611 (1964); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 189.010-.080 (1967);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 502:18,502-A:l 1-12 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-15-1 to -3 (1972);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-177 (1965), § 15.177.1 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CTN. CODE § 33-12-40 (1960);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 44.17 (1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.20.070 (1965); W. VA.
CODE ANN.

§ 50-18-2 (1966).

"Colten v. Kentucky, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 1956 (1972). On trial de novo defendant was again
convicted, this time in the circuit court, a court of general criminal jurisdiction. He was then fined
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conviction."
Colten then appealed to the United States Supreme
7
Court.

Colten argued that the rationale used by the Court in Pearce to
limit the imposition of increased sentences on appeal was equally applic-

able to the trial de novo:15
Both . . .involve reconviction and resentencing, both provide the convicted defendant with the right to "appeal" and in both-even though
under the Kentucky scheme the "appeal" is in reality a trial de
novo-a penalty for the same crime is fixed twice, with the same
potential for an increased penalty upon a successful "appeal."' 9

The only real distinction, according to Colten, was in the source of
authority for his new trial. In Pearcethe new trial was granted after an

appellate court determination that the decision of the trial court could
not stand; in Colten the authority for the trial de novo came directly
from a statutory provision." Since no record was made of the inferior
court proceedings, appellate review in Colten was impossible. The stat-

ute, therefore, compensated for a lack of review of the inferior court
trial by assuring the defendant of a right to a new trial. Thus the distinction was in form and not substance and should not afford a basis for
withholding the Pearce limitation on increased sentences to the trial de
2
novo situation. '

The Court concluded, however, that there were in fact several
meaningful distinctions between a retrial on remand and a trial de
22
novo.
fifty dollars and costs. The circuit court judge offered no explanation for the more severe sentence.

Colten v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1971).
"The defendant appealed the decision of the circuit court to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
He challenged the constitutionality of the Kentucky Disorderly Conduct Statute as well as the
imposition of a more severe sentence in the circuit court. The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the statute and the imposition of the increased sentence. Colten v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 374, 378-79 (Ky. 1971).
'"Colten argued that the disorderly conduct statute was unconstitutionally broad and vague
both on its face and as applied, and that the increased sentence twice placed him in jeopardy and
deprived him of due process of law. Brief for Appellant at 15, 32, 38, Colten v. Kentucky, 92 S.
Ct. 1953 (1972).
"Id.at 40.
"Colten v. Kentucky, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1960 (1972).
2
See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
21
Brief for Appellant at 41.
2Mr. Justice Marshall, in dissent, took the view that Pearcewas based upon the recognition
that "whenever a defendant is tried twice for the same offense, there is inherent in the situation
the danger of vindictive sentencing the second time around, and that this danger will deter some
defendants from seeking a second trial." 92 S. Ct. at 1965.
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We note first the obvious: that the court which conducted Colten's

trial and imposed the final sentence was not the court with whose work
Colten was sufficiently dissatisfied to seek a different result on appeal;
and it is not the court that is asked to do over what it thought it had
already done correctly. Nor is the de novo court even asked to find
error in another court's work.?3
Furthermore, the Court concluded that there was no reason to believe
that the superior court would deal any more strictly with a trial de novo
defendant than with a defendant initially appearing before that court. 24
The reasons offered by the Court to distinguish Pearce from the
trial de novo situation in Colten are not completely convincing. The
Supreme Court seemed to believe that the danger of vindictiveness was
greater in Pearcebecause he was sentenced on retrial by the same court
from which he had successfully appealed. Technically it was the same
court, the Superior Court of North Carolina sitting in Durham
County,2 but two different judges presided over the two trials.20 If the
Court meant that Pearce was sentenced twice by the same judge, the
Court was clearly wrong. If the Court meant only that Pearce was
sentenced twice in the Superior Court in Durham County, the Court was
correct but its argument was greatly weakened.
Other distinctions utilized by the Court to distinguish Pearce from
Colten are similarily questionable. The Court correctly stated that the
trial de novo court in Colten was not even "asked to find error in
another court's work."' However, this is equally true of the court that
retried Pearce. Only the appellate court that remanded Pearce had the
responsibility of finding error in another court's work. The duty imposed on the court that retried Pearce was identical to the duty imposed
on the trial de novo court in Colten; that duty was to afford the defendant a fair trial consistent with constitutional safeguards.
The Court also declared that while judicial impatience towards a
defendant who has already had one fair trial was perhaps understanda23ld. at 1960.
24

1d.
"State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 151 S.E.2d 571 (1966).
21Pearce was originally sentenced by Judge Williams. Having successfully appealed this convicion, Pearce was given an increased sentence on retrial by Judge McLaughlin. State v. Pearce, 268
N.C. 707, 709, 151 S.E.2d 571,572 (1966). The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Sparrow
noted this fact but still argued that the Pearce rule should not apply to trial de novo. 276 N.C.
499, 505, 173 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1970).
2192 S. Ct. at 1960.
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ble, the trial de novo court's attitude was "much more likely" to recognize the fact that the inferior courts were not designed to offer errorfree trials. 8 The conclusion of this argument would seem to be that
therefore the trial de novo court will not become impatient with a defendant who has appealed from the inferior courts since he has probably
not been afforded all of his constitutional protections.
The reason that Pearce was retried at all, however, was because the
North Carolina Supreme Court determined that he had not received a
trial that was consistent with constitutional procedures.29 It seems, then,
that the court that retried Pearce was in the same position as a trial de
novo court. Neither court should have become impatient with a defendant who was before the court because he had not been affbrded all of
his constitutional rights in his first trial. Yet the PearceCourt acknowledged the possibility of judicial impatience, while the Colten Court did
not.
Moreover, the Court's argument assumes that the trial de novo
court will act appropriately: that the court will recognize the deficiencies
of the inferior courts and will render a fair decision unaffected by the
knowledge of defendant's prior trial. Both Pearce and Colten, however,
asserted that their respective judges had not acted appropriately in imposing sentence. The Pearce Court accepted the possibility that this had
occurred, and having recognized the extreme difficulty of proving that
a judge had been motiviated by vindictiveness towards a defendant in
determining his sentence, 3 the Court acted to eliminate the danger. The
standard of proof required to formulate the Pearce rule, therefore, was
something less than actual proof of judicial vindictiveness. There should
be grave concern in light of Pearce as to whether the Colten Court was
warranted in assuming that the trial de novo court will be "much more
likely" 31 to recognize the deficiencies of the inferior courts and act
appropriately. Nevertheless, the Court's critical conclusion was based
on that assumption:
We see no reason, and none is offered, to assume that the de novo court

will deal any more strictly with those who insist on a trial in the
superior court after conviction in the Quarterly Court than it would
with those defendants whose cases are filed originally in the superior
"Id; see Aplin, supra note 8, at 458-59.
nState v. Pearce, 266 N.C. 234, 145 S.E.2d 918 (1966).

'-395 U.S. at 725 n.20.
3192 S. Ct. at 1960.
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court and who choose to put
the State to its proof in a trial subject to
32
constitutional guarantees.
At least one commentator has reached a contrary conclusion:
Procedural complication also increases the pressure on officials to
dispose of cases with the acquiescence of the accused. An ironic result
of over-reliance on discretionary disposition is that, however compassionate its intent, the need to gain this acquiescence leads officials to
place a heavy price in the form of enhanced severity on those who
invoke3 the formal process but do not succeed in avoiding punish3
ment.
Yet one recent study dramatically supports the Court's conclusion.34
The results of this survey show that forty-four percent of the defendants
who had appealed their convictions in the inferior courts of Boston,
Massachusetts, were given lighter sentences in the superior courts, while
only one percent of those defendants were given increased sentences. 3
These figures seem to support the conclusion that trial de novo courts
do not, as a general policy, impose more severe sentences on defendants
who appeal from the inferior courts. Yet Pearce was not based on a
finding that courts followed such a policy, but only on the finding that
increased sentences did occur with sufficient frequency to require protection of defendant's rights.3 1 Conversely, the Colten Court did not
base its decision on the infrequency of increased sentences in the superior court. Colten thus cannot be distinguished from Pearce on this
basis.
Colten also argued that Kentucky's two-tier court system placed an
unconstitutional burden on defendant's right to a fair trial.3 A defendant who is charged with a misdemeanor in Kentucky is generally required to stand trial in a court which was not designed to afford the
defendant a trial consistent with constitutional requirements. When the
defendant seeks such a trial, however, he is told that he may suffer a
more severe sentence than that received in the inferior court. Colten
32

1d.

1Rosett, Discretion, Severeity and Legality in CriminalJustice, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 12, 26

(1972).
"See Note, Abolition of Trial De Novo-An Errorin Judgment, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 919,
923 (1972).

'Id.
1395 U.S. at 725. See also 92 S. Ct. at 1960.
'Brief for Appellant at 46-47.
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argued that this was contrary to fundamental notions of procedural
fairness. Thus defendant was unduly disadvantaged in seeking a fair
trial.
The Court concluded that Kentucky's two-tier court system did not
disadvantage defendants as long as a trial in a court of general jurisdiction was available to them.38 The Court noted the advantages a defendant received in the inferior court: simple and speedy proceedings, lenient sentences, the opportunity to learn about the prosecution's case, the
aid of counsel if confronted with the realistic threat of a prison sentence,
and the opportunity to dispense with the inferior court trial by pleading
guilty and then promptly receiving a trial de novo in a superior court.39
The state had none of these options. The Court characterized the inferior court trial as merely "an offer in settlement" of defendant's case
which the defendant was free to accept or refuse."0
It is clear that the defendant does suffer some disadvantages in
being tried in the inferior court. The defendant does not have the option
of electing whether he will receive an inferior court trial.41 Therefore
some defendants who want a trial in the inferior court do not receive
one, while other defendants are forced to go into the inferior court when
they have no intention of waiving their right to a trial fully protected
by constitutional safeguards. A defendant who is represented by a lawyer in both the inferior and superior courts will suffer an increase in
attorney's fees. Also, defendant may suffer a greater delay in receiving
a final determination of his case than if he were permitted to go directly
to the superior court. Further, in order to bypass an inferior court trial
the defendant must plead guilty. The Court believed that these disadvantages were balanced by the advantages available to the defendant in the
two-tier system. Since any burden on defendant's right to appeal was
offset by the benefits he received, there was no violation of due process.4 "
The Court also concluded that if the Pearce rule were applied to
the trial de novo, inferior court judges might cease imposing lenient
"92 S. Ct. at 1961. The Court seems here to adopt implicitly the view that a burden on
defendant's right to appeal does not violate due process as long as that burden is a reasonable one.
See Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353, 355-56 (1st Cir. 1969); Mann v. Commonwealth,
Mass. ___ 271 N.E.2d 331, 334-35 (1971).
'92 S. Ct. at 1961.
"Id; see Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353, 355 (1st Cir. 1969).
"The arresting officer in the Kentucky system has the option of selecting the court in which
defendant is to stand trial. Id. at 1958.
41d. at 1960-61.
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sentences in order to allow superior court judges full discretion in sentencing defendants on reconviction.43 This is one possible result of
applying the Pearce rule to trial de novo. Another possibility is that
nearly all defendants might exercise their right to a trial de novo if they
were protected from the threat of increased sentences in the superior
courts. Defendants then would have nothing to lose by appealing. Either
of these possibilities would result in so many appeals to the superior
courts that the existence of the inferior courts would be threatened.
These predictions, however, conflict with actual experience. In
Minnesota application of the Pearce rule to trial de novo did not result
in an undue burden on the superior courts.44 Also, New Mexico has had
a statute since 1968 which prohibits increased sentences in the superior
court. 5 Apparently the inferior courts of New Mexico are still operating
effectively to relieve the caseload burden of the superior courts despite
the fact that defendants have nothing to lose by appealing the sentence
of the inferior courts. Perhaps the best explanation of this experience is
that the majority of criminal defendants in the inferior courts are
guilty." For many of these defendants the only question is the severity
of the sentence to be imposed.47 Since sentences in the inferior courts
are not characteristically severe,4" the defendant realizes that while he
has nothing to lose by demanding an appeal he does not really have
anything to gain.
The question still remains, however, as to why the Court in Colten
rejected the same argument that was successful in Pearce. One answer
concerns the relative increase in severity of the sentences. In Pearcethe
sentence of one defendant was increased from ten to twenty-five years."
The Pearce Court felt that this great increase in punishment by itself
was sufficient to compel a recognition of possible judicial vindictiveness
absent other mitigating evidence.5" Apparently, the fatal deficiency in
Colten's case was that his original fine of ten dollars when increased to
"Id. at 1961; see State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970).
"Brief for Respondent at 20-21, North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971).
'N.M. STAT. ANN. § 36-15-3(B)(2) (Supp. 1972).
"See Note, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV., supra note 34, at 930. See also ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES

(Tent. Draft, 1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA].
"ABA 1.
"Note, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV., supra note 34, at 929.
"1395 U.S. at 714.
'Id. at 725-26.
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a fine of fifty dollars by the superior court was not shocking enough by
itself to compel the conclusion that the increased sentence had been
motivated by judicial vindictiveness. The Colten Court therefore required some evidence indicating why the superior court had treated the
defendant any differently or more severely than defendants originally
before the court.5 In Pearcethe increased sentence itself was sufficient.
In Colten the Court found the increased sentence insufficient without
more evidence. Whether the Court was motivated by the factual distinctions between the two types of appeals or by the belief that such a
decision was required to preserve the effectiveness of the inferior court
system, the rationale for the decision is debatable.
The effects of Colten on the practical operation of the inferior court
system remain to be seen. Whether a criminal defendant convicted in
an inferior court will now more readily accept the sentence of the lower
court or whether inferior court judges will become more disposed to
offer lenient sentences as an incentive to defendants to accept their
judgment as final cannot be predicted. Yet two effects of this decision
are certain: the benefits of the inferior court system in terms of facilitating the efficient administration of criminal justice have been protected
from one possible threat of erosion, and the potential threat of isolated
instances of vindictive sentencing in less serious criminal cases has not
been eradicated.
ROBERT

Louis QUICK

Criminal Procedure-Use of the Reasonable Doubt Standard in Ruling
on a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure instructs the
trial judge to "order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more
offenses charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on
either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction
of such offense or offenses."' For many years the various federal courts
of appeals set different standards for a trial judge in ruling on motions
for judgment of aquittal. However, the recent decision in UnitedStates
1192 S.Ct. at 1960.
'FED. R. CRII. P. 29(a).

